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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DEBRA KAMMERSELL, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
vs. : 
JEFFREY KAMMERSELL, : Case No. 890238 
Defendant/Appellant, : Category 14b 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this Appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2(a)-3 (j). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Appeal is taken from a Judgment by Judge David E. 
Roth, of the Second Judicial District Court, sitting without a 
jury, on March 31, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in 
failing to adopt the recommendation of the Domestic Relations 
Commissioner concerning the retro-activity of a reduced child 
support award, by failing to give full faith and credit to the 
modification of a Utah Child Support Order by a Pennsylvania 
Court, or in the alternative, 
2. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in not 
allowing the retro-active order for a reduction in child support 
to begin at the time of the filing of the Petition to Modify, 
rather than at the time of the initial determination by the 
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Domestic Relations Commissioner. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR RULES 
Section 77-61 (a)-30 Utah Code Annotated, (1953 as 
amended) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 15, 1987, the Defendant in this action 
brought a Petition to Modify the parties Utah Divorce Decree 
which would have the effect of lowering the child support set 
forth in the original Decree and asking that such a modification 
be made retro-active to a determination by the Court of Common 
Pleas of Allegheny County, State of Pennsylvania which reduced 
the Defendant's child support in 1982. 
On June 20, 1988, the Domestic Relations Commissioner for 
the Second Judicial District, Maurice Richards, made a 
recommendation that the District Court give full faith and credit 
to the Pennsylvania Order and modified the Utah Decree child 
support award, retro-active to October 15, 1982 and modified a 
child support payment which under the Utah Decree had been $150 
per month, per child, (a total of $300 per month, as there were 
two (2) children) to $80 per month, per child, or a $160 per 
month. 
The Commissioner further determined that based upon the 
retro-activity recommendation the Defendant was not in arrears of 
any child support amounts at that time. The State of Utah 
objected to that portion of the Commissioner's Order which 
modified the child support Order retro-active to October 15, 1982 
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and a hearing was conducted on the State's objection before the 
Honorable David E. Roth of the Second Judicial District Court on 
September 2, 1988. 
Following a consideration of the arguments of counsel, 
testimony of the Plaintiff and the presentation of memorandum, 
the Court entered its Order reversing the Commissioner's 
Recommendation concerning the retro-activity of the reduction of 
child support based on the Pennsylvania Order and allowed a 
reduction of child support to run only from the date of the 
Commissioner's decision, June 20, 1988. 
An appeal from that decision to this Court was filed on 
April 17, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 20, 1981, the Plaintiff and Defendant in this 
action were residents of Weber County, State of Utah and were 
divorced by the Second Judicial District Court and pursuant to 
the Decree of Divorce, the Defendant was ordered to pay the sum 
of $150 per month, per child, as and for child support for a 
total of $300 per month as the parties had two (2) minor 
children. 
At the time of the divorce, the Defendant was working 
full time at Morton Thiokol's Wasatch Division and earning 
approximately $13 an hour or approximately $2,100 a month. As 
such, the Court set his child support at $150 per month, per 
child, or $300 for the two (2) children. (See Record on Appeal-
Divorce Decree) 
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Shortly after the parties divorce, the Defendant was 
removed from his job due to a reduction in force and thereafter, 
moved to Pennsylvania where he entered college and began working 
part-time. At that time, the Defendant's income was reduced to 
approximately $6 an hour or less than one-half his previous wage. 
In light of these changed circumstances, the Defendant petitioned 
the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, State of 
Pennsylvania, File No. FD 82-7765, for a reduction of child 
support. 
At that time, the Plaintiff was receiving welfare 
assistance in the State of Utah and had assigned her rights to 
the Office of Recovery Services through the State of Utah, 
Department of Social Services. (Tp. September 2, 1988 p. 19) 
The Utah Office of Recovery Services was made a party to 
the Pennsylvania action. Following a hearing on October 15, 
1982, the Pennsylvania Court ordered that the Defendant's child 
support be reduced to $80 per month, per child, for a total of 
$160 per month. 
From that time until 1987, the Defendant paid the $160 
amount ordered by the Pennsylvania Court. At no time during the 
ensuing years following the Pennsylvania Court's modification of 
the Utah Order, did either the Plaintiff or the State of Utah 
attempt to change the Pennsylvania Order or attempt to enforce 
the original Utah child support Order against the Defendant. 
(Tp. 20-22) During the major portion of that five (5) year 
period, the Plaintiff was receiving State assistance. 
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In early 1987, the Plaintiff, through the Office of 
Recovery Services, executed on the Defendant's 198 6 income tax 
return based upon tfre Utah Decree. The Defendant then petitioned 
the Pennsylvania Court to credit a support overpayment in the 
amount of $1,3 07.88 in September of 1987 based upon the previous 
modification. (See Record on Appeal - documents presented at 
Hearing before Domestic Relations Commissioner) 
On October 7, 1987, with the Plaintiff being represented 
by the State of Pennsylvania, through its URESA compact, the 
Court ruled that the Defendant had in fact, overpaid through the 
month of September, the sum of $987.88. 
On November 15, 1987, the Defendant brought a Petition to 
Modify the Utah Divorce Decree and requested a retro-active Order 
of modification of the child support amount in the Second 
Judicial District Court in Weber County. This was the first 
action initiated in the State of Utah since the parties original 
divorce. 
On June 20, 1988, the Domestic Relations Commissioner for 
the Second Judicial District, after hearing the evidence of the 
parties, recommended that the Court give full faith and credit 
to the Pennsylvania Court Order, retro-active to October 15, 1982 
and based upon that continuing Order, found that the Defendant 
was not in arrears, that he had in fact, paid all child support 
based on the $160 per month figure and modified the Utah Decree 
retro-actively to October 15, 1982 to the sum of $80 per month, 
per child, for a total of $160 per month. (See Decision by 
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Domestic Relations Commissioner) 
The State of Utah objected to the Recommendation and a 
hearing was held .thereon on September 2, 1988 with Second 
Judicial District Court Judge David Roth presiding. On March 
31, 1989 he ruled that the Commissioner's recommendation would 
not be approved and that while there was a substantial change of 
circumstance to warrant a reduction in the child support at this 
time, based upon the Defendant's continued income level of 
approximately $6 an hour, it would not be made retro-active to 
October of 1982, but would begin as of the date of the 
Commissioner's ruling, June 20, 1988. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This case brings into focus the application of Oglesby v. 
Oglesby, 510 P. 2d 1106, a 1973 case, in which this Court 
interpreted the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement Support Act 
provision 77-61(a)-30 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), 
concerning the relationship between the initiating and 
responding states in a URESA action, affecting the modification 
of a child support order. 
While there is no question that a responding state can 
modify an initiating state's Order, the more complicated issue is 
whether the initiating state is required to give full faith and 
credit to the responding state's modification, if that 
modification is subsequently presented to the initiating state. 
In this case, the District Court Judge read Oglesby very 
strictly and determined that Utah Courts were not required to 
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give full faith and credit to the Courts of other states in this 
situation and a child support award could not be modified unless 
the modification occurred in the initiating state. 
Defendant believes that the Court failed to properly 
apply Oqlesby * * le particular iacts ot thin rase and failed 
further to rea^h an appropriate equitable accommodation between 
Oqlesby and this case, which should be allowed under the language 
nt t hat dei • is 11 mi ' -. 
Defendant further believes that Oqlesby should be read to 
allow the retro-active modification sought in this case, or it 
should be modified by this Court to provide for the particular 
situation that arose in this case in which all of the equities 
ancj f Undamenta] fairness favor the Def endai it, s p o s ? • - • i. 
It was the Defendant who initially sought :< modification 
of the initiating state's decree in a responding state. The 
P1 a i i 11 i f f f a i ] e c:i t o t a k e a i I > a c 11 o i I t: • D O p p o s e s u c h m o d i f i c a t i o n. 
The Plaintiff, over a five (5) year period, failed to assert the 
jurisdiction of the initiating state and it was the Defendant who 
brought the acti on to modify the Decree i n the I nitiating state 
and :i t was only at that time that the Plaintiff raised the issue 
of the lack of full fa 1 11 I a i i c:i :: i: e < :i :i t i i I i : e s p o n s e t: « :) P ] a :i n t :i f f' s 
petition. 
There was no issue as to the Defendant's changed 
ci rcumstances :i i I tl le i ill t:i at:i ng state or til: le responding state as 
the Plaintiff never provided any evidence disputing Defendant's 
changed circumstances in either forum, thus either the Oqlesby 
7 
decision should be read to accommodate this particular situation 
or should be modified to provide relief to the Defendant in this 
particular situation and allow the modification by the 
Pennsylvania Court to be retro-active in Utah to the date of the 
Pennsylvania modification. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ADOPT THE 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATION 
TO ALLOW A RETRO-ACTIVE MODIFICATION OF A UTAH 
CHILD SUPPORT AWARD BY A FOREIGN JURISDICTION. 
Utah has adopted the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act, Title 77-60 et seq., with the clear legislative 
intent that collection of child support is a national concern and 
those individuals obligated to pay support should not be allowed 
to escape their obligation simply by moving to and residing in 
another state. 
Defendant takes no issue with the stated purpose of this 
act, nor the necessity of such an interstate alliance. This 
Court however, has on only one occasion, attempted to explain 
some of the nuances of the Act as it applies to actual support 
situations. 
The case of Oglesby v. Oglesby, 510 P. 2d 1106 was 
decided by the Court in 1973. This case involved a circumstance 
in which parties were divorced in Utah and the father, who was 
under an Order to pay child support removed himself to the State 
of Washington. In Washington, the father sought and obtained a 
modification of the Utah Decree, lowering his child support. The 
mother, still residing in the State of Utah however, brought an 
8 
action in the State of Utah for child support arrearages under 
the original Utah Decree. The father sought to assert the 
Was! , i-;.i. .1 . i-..- ^ M tue Petition for arrearages and 
this Court denied that relief stating: 
"That Decree was never modified by the 
Utah Court which should be given full 
faith and credit until changed by a 
duly constituted Utah Court and 
particularly where no evidence supports 
a changed circumstance situation, not 
the case here. (Emphasis added) 
In this rather perfunctory decision the Court basically 
indicated that: in idei: Title 77-61 (a)-3 0 a responding state can 
certa in] y m o d :i f y pur suai it t< :> a I JRESA action an i n \ elating state ' s 
Order and if the individual so affected by the modification paid 
the amount required by the modification he con] d not be he], d i n 
contempt. However, until the initiating state changed the Order, 
arrearages on the initiating state's original Order could 
accumulate and coi ;i ] d 1: >e as : t - T .- : e ii Id:i vidua] in : equi red 
to pay child support. 
The basic impact of the case seems to be th u while a 
from the original state 
where the Divorce Decree was entered and seek relief in a foreign 
state, in order to completely be protected from the accumulation 
nl" <ii reai:ages he must return f*n tho nitiating state and file a 
Petition for Modification there. 
Because URESA is means for ei: if orcing 
chiId support awards nationwide I ;i >. nvolves the logistic 
• r securing those Orders in foreign states, a rather interesting 
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dichotomy has evolved, A great majority of states have followed 
the Oqlesby rationale, with respect to the authorization of a 
responding state to.depart from the initiating state's Decree and 
not requiring that it give full faith and credit simply because 
the initiating state made the initial determination. 
In fact, the states of Alabama, California, Delaware, 
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nevada, New -Hampshire, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Vermont, Virginia and Washington, have followed that rationale. 
Conversely, however, Utah and some other states seem to have 
suggested that the initiating state is not bound to give full 
faith and credit to the responding state's modification and 
therefore, it is highly possible that a child support obligor 
can be subjected to two (2) different competing Orders, both of 
which are valid, but by obeying one he or she may be in contempt 
of the other, or at the very least, substantial arrearages may 
accumulate. 
Defendant does not believe that this parallel 
jurisdictional dichotomy was intended by the legislatures of the 
various states, but what was clearly intended was that child 
support obligor be required to pay, and that they be required to 
pay no matter where they live and that states do what they can to 
give full faith and credit to other state's Orders, but the also 
must recognize the exigent and changed circumstances that 
frequently occur with a child support obligor's ability to pay. 
The Court is directed to an excellent ALR annotation, 31 
10 
ALR 4, cited as the Construction and Affect of Provisions of the 
Uniform Reciprocal Support Act, That no support Order shall 
supersede or nullify any other Order. (Pg. 349-382) 
This article discusses in great depth the problems of 
compet • jurisdictions. It is ii iteresti i ig tha t in every case, 
including the Oglesby case in Utah where Courts uphold an 
initiating state's refusal to give full faith and credit to a 
responding state's previous modification, the facts of the cases 
have consistently been connection with Petitions for child 
support arrearages or to enforce the initiating state's child 
support Order and the child support obligor then raises the 
responding state's modification as an offset to the arrearage 
Order songl it to be obtai i led. '".; -";v" • •' 
There are no cases which take the above position *: which 
there was simply an action filed in the initiating state by the 
cliiId support obligor to modify the initiating state's Decree 
and make it retro-active based upon responding state's prior 
modi *" i * -.v 
However, that is the fact situation in this case. It is 
important for this Court to note that in this case no attempt was 
ever si lppor t ob] Igee < + he motl ie:i : ) to ever 
contest. 1 .,- mattei .: Pennsylvania, even though she was being 
represented by the State of Utah, nor did she ever bring a 
Pet I ti on ^ :>i :t I: ler oi\ i I :: :i : til: ii: oi igl I tl le State of I Jtal I to eol leet r.hj Id 
support arrearages during the period from 1982 until the petition 
that initiated this case was filed. 
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It is also important to note that there is no evidence to 
contradict the fact that by 1982, when the Defendant petitioned 
the Court in Pennsylvania for a modification of the Utah Order, 
he had undergone a substantial change of circumstance. His 
salary had been reduced by at least one-half and that condition 
was to remain constant throughout the ensuing years, to and 
including the present. 
The Court is urged to focus once again on the precise 
language of Oglesby when the Court seems to suggest that in that 
case there was no evidence (in the Washington proceeding) in 
which the Utah Court could have supported a substantial change of 
circumstance. That is not the case here. The evidence 
overwhelmingly supported a substantial change of circumstance in 
198 2 and at the present. 
This Court is directed to a sister state case in 
Illinois, Sullivan v. Sullivan, 424 NE.2d 957 (1981) in which the 
rationale suggested herein was followed: 
"Even though the URESA Court modified a 
Judgment which was not subject to 
modification in Illinois and thereby 
failed to give the Illinois Order full 
faith and credit, the responding 
Court's Order was nonetheless entitled 
to full faith and credit. Any 
objections the wife had concerning the 
Court's modification should have been 
directly appealed in the URESA action 
and not collaterally attacked in the 
initiating state." 
The Court in that case found that the party against whom 
the Order was sought to be modified could have been represented 
in the URESA proceeding, could have presented arguments as to why 
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the initiating state's Order should or should have not been 
modified and chose not to do so and In fact , chose not to appeal 
that st/• alirig, biit then collaterally attacked the Judgment 
in the initiating state. 
That is precisely the situation in this case. Following 
tl le Defendar it's mo ^ e 1: :o Pennsylvania the Plaintiff was receiving 
state assistance from the State of Utah and therefore, assigned 
her rights to the Office of Recovery Services. ORS was apprised 
of and represented by agents in the State of Pennsylvania in the 
Pennsylvania proceeding. They never presented evidence in that 
p r o c e e d i n g nor d 11: 1 e ;r a p p e a ] t h i = p r o ceeding at that time. 
They never sought to enforce arrearages in Utah and in fact, the 
state took no action to enforce child support arrearages which 
may or maj i 10 Is ha\ e beei 1 claimed to be owed by them during the 
entire period while the Plaintiff was on state assistance. 
The Plaintiff testi.fi.-n r :* •» ! <• i^ft state assistance in 
1987 and in fact, is i. > longer receiving assistance and 
therefore^ the state itself has no claim for arrearages in this 
case. Tho on I y purported ci aim 1 i os now 1th \-\u> V La ini i f f who 
has never before made a claim for any arrearages or attempted to 
enforce the original Utah Order, although she could have done so 
ii 1 Penns^ i vani a . .. ' .•'. • -. . •• - •' -. • . • 
The Defendant contends that the fact situation of this 
case has never before been considered by this Cour t: :i n applying 
the Oglesby rationale. The Court in Oglesby. however with the 
language that has previously been discussed concerning the 
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failure of the facts (in that case) to support a change of 
circumstance already carved an exception, which should allow 
Defendant the relief he seeks. 
Notwithstanding that argument, the equities in the case 
also compel this Court to modify Oqlesby to hold that in this 
type of case where the child support obligor obtains a 
modification in a responding jurisdiction and then asks to have 
that jurisdiction's modification made retro-active in the 
initiating state, in the absence of any other action taken by 
either the initiating state or the child support obligee, that 
fundamental fairness and equity would compel in that circumstance 
that the initiating state give full faith and credit to the 
modification and make the award retro-active to the date of 
modification in the responding state. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully requests that this Court in 
considering the specific facts of this case and their prior 
decision in Oqlesby in the alternative, either bring this case 
within the ambit of Oqlesby and the exception contained therein 
in which a factual determination has been made that a change of 
circumstance existed which compels the initiating state to adopt 
the responding state's modification, or in the alternative, 
modify Oqlesby to allow for a retro-active modification of child 
support in this case and in future cases in which the facts 
demonstrate that: 1) the child support obligor sought a 
modification in a responding state; 2) proved factually a change 
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of circumstances; 3) the child support obligee had the 
opportunity to be r epresented to contest the issue; 4) the child 
support obligor tajces no further action to either appeal or 
enforce the initiating states order; and 5) the child support 
obligei bri ngs ai I act:i oi I i i the initiating state to adopt the 
responding state's modification in that case, the initiating 
state should adopt the responding stated modification and make 
it retro-acti ve the date the modification was granted in the 
responding state, 
RESPECTFIII,1,Y SUBMITTED t M s / 7 (Jay/ of July, 1989. 
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